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“100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces”: The 
Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai
1
 
Austin Clark 
 
 In the year 1545, during the latter half of 
Japan‘s Sengoku Period or ―Age of Warring 
States‖, the minor samurai Ukida Naoie was 
assigned thirty men and a small fief in the province 
of Bizen. His task was to cultivate and defend this 
small corner of the province from the ambitious and 
power-hungry lords and bandits that abounded in 
the Sengoku Period, but Naoie set his sights higher. 
Given direct control over his thirty men, a mere 
garrison force of infantry, he used them to conquer 
and rule over neighboring fiefs in the province. His 
reputation and his army grew with each victory and 
before long, Naoie controlled more than a tenth of 
                                                 
1
 ―The Seventeen-Article Injunction of Asakura 
Toshikage, c. 1480,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to 
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 176. 
8 
Bizen and over half of his original thirty men had 
castles and fiefs to call their own. Naoie himself 
ruled out of Okayama castle, which he had built for 
himself, and kept a tight rein on his subordinates 
through taxation and rotation of service. In 1577 
Naoie, after taking over most of the neighboring 
Matsuda lord‘s forts and province, stormed his own 
lord‘s keep under flimsy pretenses and seized 
control of the now expanded Bizen.
2
 
 Ukida Naoie‘s bloody and meteoritic rise to 
power in the space of just thirty years was similar to 
that of several, eventually more well known 
daimyo, or Japanese feudal lords. Oda Nobunaga 
especially would write a similar story, albeit on a 
larger scale, expanding from his inherited Owari 
                                                 
2
 John Whitney Hall, ―Foundations of the Modern 
Japanese Daimyo,‖ The Journal of Asian Studies 20, No. 2 
(May 1961): 323-325. 
9 
province in south-central Japan to unite most of the 
main Japanese island of Honshū.3 This move would 
propel him into history as the first of Japan‘s great 
unifiers, three individuals who would overcome 
long odds to consolidate their power and pull Japan 
out of the tumultuous Sengoku Period. The other 
two, following almost immediately on the heels of 
Nobunaga, were Toyotomi Hideyoshi and 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, who would complete the 
centralization of power and control set in motion by 
their predecessor. Yet the enormous power and 
influence this trio of unifiers wielded did not 
materialize overnight and its genesis is somewhat 
obscure, even if the legacy it left is not. 
 The turmoil of the Sengoku Period gave 
birth to the centralized power Ukida Naoie would 
                                                 
3
 Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 
(Surrey, England: Japan Library, 1996), 132-135. 
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tinker with and all three of the unifiers would come 
to enjoy. As a period of constant and chaotic 
warfare, Sengoku stormed the walls of well-
established tradition and forged quite literally in the 
heat of battle a new dominant military force that 
would shape the social order of the next 350 years 
and give brilliant men like Nobunaga and Hideyoshi 
the means to come to power. The localized nature of 
the Sengoku Period fighting and the increasing role 
of technology established the infantryman as the 
decisive force on the battlefield, toppling the 
mounted samurai out of dominance and giving the 
ambitious daimyo who controlled them 
unprecedented power. The leaders who recognized 
this social shift and founded their influence in a 
large corps of disciplined, professional infantry 
11 
would emerge victorious and found their shogunal 
power in these ideas.  
 The dominance of infantry on the battlefield 
by the end of the Sengoku Period was absolute. A 
look at the muster rolls for the daimyo Gotō 
Sumiharu in 1592, part of Hideyoshi‘s ill-fated 
invasion of Korea, reveals that 90% of his force was 
made up of infantry; out of 220 men only 27 were 
samurai on horses.
4
 Takeda Shingen, a daimyo who 
became known for his use of an exceptional amount 
of cavalry, as well as his skill in using them, had a 
ratio of approximately two infantrymen to every 
horseman in his army. By 1590, when Hideyoshi 
was firmly in control and just finishing his 
unification of Japan, he ordered troops from the 
Daté household and asked that they be supplied 
                                                 
4
 Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan’s 
Korean War 1592-1598, (London: Cassell & Co, 2002), 44. 
12 
with only thirty horses.
5
 At the battle of Sekigahara 
in 1600, the battle in which Tokugawa Ieyasu 
would take control of Japan from Hideyoshi‘s heir 
and lead it into centuries of peace, about 85,000 
men were involved on each side.
6
 Added together 
170,000 men fought on the small plain at 
Sekigahara, many times more than could be 
mustered simply from the elite seven to eight 
percent of a warrior society. 
The meaning of the term ―Sengoku Period‖ 
itself speaks eloquently to the situation in which the 
infantry suddenly found themselves prominent: 
The aggregation of private 
wars…became combined into a 
simple struggle for survival with 
                                                 
5
 Delmer M. Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on 
Japanese Warfare, 1543-98,‖ The Far Eastern Quarterly 7, 
No. 3 (May, 1948): 244. 
6
 Michael Haskew, Christer Jorgensen, Chris McNab, 
Eric Niderost and Rob S. Rice, Fighting Techniques of the 
Oriental World AD 1200-1860: Equipment, Combat Skills and 
Tactics (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2008), 164. 
13 
rapidly changing alliances, triumphs 
and disasters, that was to last for 
over a century. Borrowing an 
expression from the Chinese, the 
years for 1490 to 1600 are called the 
‗Sengoku-Jidai,‘ which is best 
translated as ‗the Age of the Country 
at War.‘ It was war on a scale vaster 
and more terrible than Japan had yet 
experienced.
7
 
 
The ―war on a scale vaster and more 
terrible‖ was, by and large, due to infantry 
involvement. The reason is twofold. In 1568, while 
the Sengoku infighting raged in many ways its 
hottest, Japan had a population of a staggering 10 
million people, spread over three main islands.
8
 
These islands were, in turn, covered by mountains, 
with geographically youthful bedrock peaks 
covering 80% of Japan‘s surface. The remaining 
portion was made up primarily of uniformly flat 
                                                 
7
 Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 116.  
8
 Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, (Berkley, 
California: University of California Press, 1993), 11. 
14 
lowlands, the three largest of which came to house 
the majority of Japan‘s population.9 The 
geographical closeness of the islands translated into 
localized and dense fighting. The plain of 
Kawanakajima, one of the few open plains nestled 
between several mountain ranges and rivers, 
witnessed no less than five battles between 1553 
and 1564, strong testimony to how Japan‘s 
geography influenced its wars.
10
 
 Historically, however, this influence had not 
always held true. In past wars, Japanese armies 
relied on the elite, mounted samurai horse archers 
who would respond quickly to a threat across any 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 5. 
10
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 269. 
15 
portion of the islands.
11
 The system had evolved out 
of eight and ninth century conflicts with the Emishi, 
the ―barbarians‖ who inhabited northern Japan, 
when their light, mobile and hard hitting cavalry 
wrecked one Japanese expedition after another.
12
 
The tradition was further refined after the Mongol 
invasions of the 1200‘s showed the need for less 
cumbersome armor and the utility of the close-
combat oriented spear or naginata.
13
 With the 
coming of the Sengoku Period, the close, violent 
fighting that resulted would dramatically change the 
way the Japanese looked at war. 
 This closeness, when combined with Japan‘s 
comparatively immense population, turned infantry 
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 Arnold Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th 
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖ 
Military History 28 (December 2004). 
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Paul Varley, Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the 
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 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 91. 
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into a natural and easily available fighting force. 
Daimyo, the feudal Japanese lords whose constant 
and varied bids for power perpetuated the civil war, 
were ever vigilant for ways to gain the upper hand. 
Japan‘s geography and large population made it 
easy to recruit, concentrate, and fight with masses 
of foot soldiers. Initially these ashigaru, literally 
meaning ―light feet‖ because of their tendency to 
loot the battlefields and towns in the manner of 
more modern ―footpads,‖ were almost mercenary in 
nature, fighting for the spoils they could steal and 
having little loyalty, often drifting off to tend crops 
or even to switch sides if the opportunities for 
bounty looked more promising. To compound 
issues, they were almost to a man poorly trained and 
ill-disciplined, making their only real value the 
17 
numbers in which they were available.
14
 By the end 
of the Sengoku Period, these issues would largely 
be solved and the lowly ashigaru would change the 
face of Japanese society, not only by virtue of their 
numbers but of the increasing role of technology in 
warfare. 
 The increases, improvements, and 
innovations made in Japanese warfare technology 
during the Sengoku Period were to have their most 
profound effect on the infantry. Up until this time 
weapons, armor, and technological advances 
associated with war had been reserved exclusively 
for the upper class and mounted samurai who were 
doing the majority of the fighting. With infantry 
rapidly becoming a major factor at the beginning of 
the sixteenth century, it was only logical that those 
                                                 
14
 Stephen Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 84-85. 
18 
advances, and newer ones spurred on by the near 
constant fighting, would be applied to them 
eventually. These technological advances would 
have the effect of not only making infantry more 
and more of a force to be reckoned with on the 
battlefield, but also of instilling a sense of discipline 
and uniformity among the ―ashigaru‖. 
 Perhaps the best example for the creation of 
uniformity and effectiveness among the ranks of 
ashigaru is the evolution of their armor. The first 
ashigaru simply brought whatever armor he owned, 
often none, to the battlefield, and looted what more 
he could take after the battle.
15
 As the century wore 
on and more and more daimyo recognized the 
impact their infantry were having on the battlefield, 
they began to issue them what is known as okashi 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 85-86. 
19 
gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which consisted chiefly of a 
breastplate (dô) and a short armored skirt 
(kusazuri).
16
 This armor was fairly cheap and easy 
to make thanks largely to changes brought on by 
heavy campaigning, namely the simplification of 
the lacing that held individual strips of armor 
together. Typical Japanese armor of the time, such 
as the dô, were made from overlapping strips of 
iron, laced tightly together, that would provide 
surprisingly great freedom of movement. As 
demand became higher and campaigns lasted 
longer, the lacing was loosened and more 
strategically placed, making it both cheaper and 
easier to tolerate on the march.
17
 It was the ashigaru 
who benefited most from these changes, as daimyo 
                                                 
16
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 40-41. 
17
 Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 126. 
20 
were more willing and able to provide volunteers 
with suits of the reliable okashi gusoku.  
 While this minute example shows that the 
daimyo were slowly beginning to care enough about 
ashigaru to supply them, for good reason as will be 
discussed later, it also meant that the daimyo 
themselves had more control over the army and the 
individual infantrymen. Armor issued by daimyo 
was uniform in make and color and often had the 
mon, or personal heraldry of the daimyo, painted 
somewhere on it.
18
 Some leaders even went to the 
extreme of having their entire force‘s armor and 
weapons being a uniform color, such as Il 
Naomasa‘s ―Red Devils,‖ who were clad entirely in 
shades of red.
19
 While instances of this extreme are 
uncommon, the uniformity of the issued armor 
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 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 86. 
19
 Turnbull, The Samurai Sourcebook , 44. 
21 
worked to unify and identify the army on the 
battlefield. Armor played a key role in helping to 
change the ashigaru from a scarcely armed rabble 
to a uniform and identifiable fighting force, helping 
to bring it together under the control of the daimyo.  
 The weapons of the ashigaru played a very 
similar, but much more visible, role in establishing 
discipline and making them a deadly force on the 
battlefield. Often simple technological innovations 
and regulations in weaponry had a massive 
battlefield and social impact. For example, the yumi, 
or the Japanese bow. Originally a weapon of the 
elite samurai, horse archers par excellence even into 
the Sengoku Period, the bow gradually found its 
way into the hands the infantry for a variety of 
reasons. Bitter military defeats in the Mongol 
invasions had taught the Japanese the power of 
22 
massed bow-fire, where many hundreds of arrows 
launched were more effective than single, well 
aimed ones.
20
 This factor had been taken into 
account before the Age of Warring States and the 
first mention of ashigaru in Japanese history comes 
out of the battles during the Nanbokuchō Wars in 
the 14
th
 century, where hundreds of shashu no 
ashigaru, ―infantry shooters,‖ were employed.21 
With the infantry becoming more numerous on the 
battlefields of the Sengoku Period, it was only a 
small step in logic to arm them with bows to 
achieve powerful massed volleys. 
 It was these volleys that the yumi excelled at 
delivering. Though it was initially a weapon of the 
samurai, the bow was fairly easy to make and 
                                                 
20
 Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th 
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖ 78. 
21
 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 84. 
23 
powerful, consisting of a strip of hardwood between 
two strips of bamboo, held together and treated with 
glue and a close binding.
22
 This layered 
construction made them individually powerful 
weapons, comparable to European longbows, and 
were augmented by a staggering variety of arrows 
made for any situation, from cutting armor to 
emitting a shrill whistling noise used for signaling 
and intimidation.
23
 Additionally, bows helped instill 
discipline in the ashigaru due to the amount of skill 
required to be an archer. Ashigaru chosen or 
volunteering to be archers would necessarily 
undergo periods of training, or help train other 
ashigaru, which would give them a previously 
unheard of amount of professionalism, a trend that 
                                                 
22
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 50. 
23
 Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 22. 
24 
continued in the use of the arquebus. Putting bows 
in the hands of the ashigaru also had the profound 
effect of breaking down varying social boundaries. 
After all, the bow had traditionally been the 
exclusive province of the mounted samurai and 
giving a weapon with such distinguished 
connotations to the lower class is one prime 
example as to how the battlefield was changing the 
way the Japanese viewed their society.  
 Another important weapon in the 
development of the ashigaru was the spear. 
Consistently overlooked, not only in Japanese 
military history, in favor gunpowder weapons and 
flashier developments, the simple nagae yari had an 
equally large impact on the use of infantry. For one, 
it was cheaper and easier to use than almost any 
other weapon, ideal for quickly arming large bodies 
25 
of men. And, above every other weapon, the spear 
favors larger numbers of troops with little training, 
as the basic use of the weapon is abundantly clear: 
stick the sharp end into the enemy. As a result, most 
Sengoku Period armies had a large percentage of 
spearmen in their ranks, often as high as 70%.
24
 
Armies of the Hōjō clan, who controlled the 
powerful Kantō region, had spearmen regularly 
make up 50% of their armies and Oda Nobunaga, 
the first great unifier, led forces that comprised of at 
least 27%.
25
 
These two factors made spears integral to 
the success not only of ashigaru, but to the daimyo 
who led them. While in its basic conception the 
spear is an easy weapon to use, spears favor their 
                                                 
24
 Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, 
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 42. 
25
 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103. 
26 
wielders working in close formation and the 
introduction of drill and discipline to the ranks of 
spearmen in this regard would increase their 
battlefield effectiveness many times over. The 
Zōhyō Monogatari, a guide to infantry tactics 
penned in 1649 by prominent samurai Matsudaira 
Nobuoki, says of the ashigaru spearmen: 
Unlike samurai spearmen, where 
spears are thought of as only for 
single combat, here many are of one 
mind, with spear points moving 
together, keeping a rhythm. When 
one or two meet it is find to fight 
individually, but when spears are 
used en masse there must be 
coordination and timing, with no 
exception.
26
 
 
                                                 
26
 ―Zōhyō Monogatari,” in Turnbull, The Samurai 
Sourcebook , 184. Note that the year, 1649, is almost half a 
century after the end of Sengoku Jidai. The author is in a 
unique position of observing the final outcome of Sengoku 
Period ashigaru tactics and integration, yet the only real 
firsthand experience he may have had would be helping put 
down the Shimabara Rebellion a decade prior in 1638. 
27 
 The fact that such a section was written 
about spear drill and tactics after the Sengoku 
Period speaks well to their developing effectiveness 
during it. It should come as no surprise to find that 
the first daimyo to introduce truly disciplined spear 
units was Oda Nobunaga, who relied greatly on 
them in most of his engagements and especially at 
Nagashino, a battle more known for his use of the 
arquebus.
27
 He made his spears uniformly longer 
than any of his opponents (5.6 meters), a detail that, 
when combined with his spearmen‘s superior 
discipline, made his cheaply outfitted ashigaru a 
true menace on the battlefield. This success set the 
precedent for spear length becoming a major factor, 
so much so that when the daimyo Hōjō Ujimasa 
mustered hastily to defend his domain from 
                                                 
27
 Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103. 
28 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Nobunaga‘s successor, he 
would decree ―a spear…is useless if it is shorter 
than two ken (twelve feet).‖28 
Yet the weapon to produce the most visible 
and sweeping changes to infantry warfare was to be 
the arquebus, an early handgun introduced by the 
Portuguese during the Sengoku Period. Unlike the 
bow and spear the arquebus had a host of initial 
problems to contend with; the ammunition and 
black powder it used could not yet be easily mass 
produced and it had a cripplingly short range and 
slow rate of fire compared to its yumi counterpart.
29
 
However, the tremendous power of the arquebus, 
                                                 
28
 ―Compulsory Military Service Decreed by Hōjō 
Ujimasa, 1587,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to 
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 186. 
29
 An experienced gunner could load, prime and fire 
in about 15 seconds. However, most ashigaru would not be 
experienced gunners and averaged around two to three shots a 
minute. Turnbull, The Samurai Sourcebook, 137-138. 
29 
commonly called a matchlock because of its system 
of firing, outweighed these disadvantages. It fired 
an 8mm caliber bullet, which could easily punch 
through even the best made suit of armor, instantly 
killing or maiming the wearer who would normally 
be almost immune to bow fire.
30
 Such weakness 
could also be mitigated by mixing bowmen into the 
arquebus formations. Most often appearing in a 
ratio of five archers to ten gunners, bowmen could 
shoot faster than their cumbersomely armed 
companions and thus maintain, to a reasonable 
degree, the rate of fire of the handgun formation 
while the arqubuses were bring reloaded. This 
combination had become so effective and such 
standard practice by the end of the Sengoku Period 
that this integration was recommended in the Zōhyō 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 137. 
30 
Monogatari, the previously mentioned guide to 
using ashigaru.
31
 Given the power of the 
matchlock, the means available to limit its 
weaknesses, and its sheer efficacy, it is no surprise 
that a general writing back to his province 
requesting reinforcements during Hideyoshi‘s 
invasion of Korea asked to ―have them bring as 
many guns as possible, for no other equipment is 
needed. Give strict orders that all men, even 
samurai, carry guns.‖32 
The arquebus had one key feature above its 
ability to turn men quickly into soldiers through 
ease of use and constant drill, in that it was usable 
almost exclusively by infantry. With its lengthy 
loading procedure, awkward size, and tremendous 
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Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 129. 
32
 Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on Japanese 
Warfare, 1543-98,‖ 241. 
31 
recoil, the matchlock was not a weapon for the 
mounted soldier. Thus, in order to take full 
advantage of the potential of these weapons, as 
many daimyo attempted to do, they had to rely on 
infantry as their handgun arm. Given the large 
proportion of infantry already in daimyo armies, 
finding these men posed no significant problem, so 
it was to the ashigaru that the matchlock conferred 
its powerful battlefield advantages. It was 
universally easier to use than a bow, which required 
much practice and a large amount of natural skill to 
fire accurately. Loading and firing a matchlock 
could be taught in a day and steady drill could turn 
men into professionals in the course of one 
campaign season. Better yet, there was almost no 
―skill,‖ per se, involved; the procedure was simply a 
series of steps to push shot down the barrel, fill the 
32 
pan with powder, and light the match to fire it, 
presumably in the direction of the enemy. The need 
for this constant drill also provided an easy means 
to turn a rabble of unskilled men into a standing 
army, working in tandem with the okashi gusoku 
loan armor to instill in the previously footloose men 
a sense of unit pride and an incentive to stay. 
Despite its disadvantage of being expensive 
and more difficult to produce, the arquebus began to 
be fielded in increasing numbers, adding to their 
effectiveness and slowly transforming Sengoku 
Period fighting. Battles began to become large scale 
maneuvers of infantry units rather than mad dashes 
into the enemy line for a chance at glory. The nature 
of the handgun and its battlefield use, concentrated 
volleys using multiple lines of gunners to try and 
keep up a steady fire, led the way in the concept and 
33 
eventual creation of units of infantry, and even 
cavalry.
33
 Soldiers would be grouped in large 
formations depending on which sort of weapon they 
held - bow, spear or arquebus - and used on the 
battlefield in groups to try and gain a tactical 
advantage. Perhaps no battle demonstrates this 
tactic better than the one that propelled Oda 
Nobunaga, the first of the great unifiers, to national 
prominence: Nagashino. 
The Battle of Nagashino itself is mostly 
represented in history books, films, and art prints as 
the slaughter of masses of samurai cavalry by the 
humble but powerful arquebus. While the arquebus 
certainly had a major role to play in the battle, 
examination of the details reveal that it is more Oda 
Nobunaga‘s consummate use of combined arms and 
                                                 
33
 Ibid., 244-245. 
34 
dependence on infantry that won the day. 
Nagashino was at once both a battle and a siege, 
fought in 1575 outside the fortress of Nagashino 
which the invading army of Takeda Katsuyori was 
attempting to wrestle from the neighboring 
Tokugawa control. Katsuyori was the son and heir 
to the more famous Takeda Shingen, who was a 
well known and much feared commander of 
cavalry, of which he possessed a large amount, 
especially during the infantry-conscious Sengoku 
Jidai. He would pass both his skills as a leader and 
his imperial ambitions onto his son, who, during the 
Nagashino campaign, attempted to fulfill his 
father‘s dream of capturing Kyoto. To do so he had 
to go through the territories of Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
the later shogun, and Oda Nobunaga, with whom he 
had established a firm and mutually beneficial 
35 
alliance in the recent years. When Nagashino, a key 
fortress in the Tokugawa interior, came under siege, 
a desperate series of actions brought both the main 
army of Ieyasu and a large relief force from 
Nobunaga.
34
  
The battle was set up along a series of 
marshy and rolling ridges just out of sight of the 
fortress of Nagashino, which was then under attack. 
Katsuyori, upon hearing of the relief forces heading 
towards the castle, decided to meet them in open 
battle in order to use his cavalry, superior in both 
training and numbers, most effectively. Nobunaga, 
whose army made up the bulk of the relief force, 
anticipated this move and drew up his army, 
predominately infantry, accordingly.
35
 He knew the 
                                                 
34
 Stephen Turnbull, Nagashino 1575 (Oxford: 
Osprey History, 2000), 7-12. 
35
 Ibid., 48-64. 
36 
strength of handguns, having fought against them in 
the hands of Buddhist monks and local alliances 
known as ikki, and he planned to use these weapons 
to their full potential.
36
  
To help guard against Katsuyori‘s fearsome 
cavalry, he created a running line of palisades 
behind which he placed his and Ieyasu‘s 3,000 
gunners. Each palisade intentionally fronted rough 
terrain and was broken periodically every few 
hundred feet, creating natural points of attack for 
Katsuyori and an easy corridor of counterattack for 
himself. As another precaution, and a sign of just 
how much value he put on the arquebus troops, he 
had his personal bodyguard, the most elite samurai 
in the army, dismount and take control of the 
separate matchlock units. This move not only 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., 19 and Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on 
Japanese Warfare, 1543-98,‖ 238. 
37 
strengthened the line, but gave the ashigaru an 
enormous shot of discipline, making sure they 
would keep courageous and steady. Behind this odd 
mix of troops he held his spearmen and many 
dismounted samurai to support or counter any 
significant breakthrough Katsuyori might achieve.
37
 
With these preparations made, he awaited the 
Takeda onslaught. 
At six o‘clock on the morning of June 28th, 
Katsuyori dutifully gave the order to charge against 
Nobunaga‘s line. The action was not as idiotic as it 
sounds. The Takeda had four samurai to every three 
of Nobunaga‘s gunners and though he was well 
aware of the power of the handgun, having seen his 
father use them in numerous siege operations, he 
was counting on a rainstorm the night before to 
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have rendered the powder and matches used for 
firing them useless. Even if they had not been 
turned into metal-augmented firewood by the 
downpour, they would only be able to get off one 
shot before his faster and more skilled mounted 
samurai were on top of them. So that morning, 
4,500 horsemen charged into the teeth of 
Nobunaga‘s arquebuses.38 
This charge was exactly what Nobunaga had 
been expecting and, to a degree, hoping for. In 
preparation, he had lined his gunners three ranks 
deep, so once the first rank had discharged their 
weapon, the second could step forwards and do so, 
then step back and let the third do the same. By the 
time the third rank had pulled the trigger, the first 
rank would ideally have reloaded and would be 
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ready to fire again. Nobunga had used this trick 
before, with success, but had never implemented it 
on such a scale. As it stood the tactic had the 
desired effect, the ashigaru having kept their 
powder and matches dry, and all Katsuyori could do 
was watch in horror as three volleys in a previously 
unbelievable succession tore his samurai apart. As 
the morning progressed, however, the Takeda 
managed to get to grips with Nobunaga‘s army, 
especially once Katsuyori committed his infantry 
and reserves, including his own personal guard. 
Nobunaga‘s right flank in particular, which was not 
protected by the palisade or any form of fence, 
became the scene of close and bloody hand-to-hand 
combat.
39
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Hours later, Nobunaga gave the signal to fall 
back to a second line of fences prepared at the same 
time as the main palisades. Once disengaged, 
Katsuyori began to move his army back to regroup 
and possibly consider retreating. Nobunaga did not 
give him a chance. Once it was clear the Takeda 
were falling back, he had his samurai mount and 
give pursuit, wreaking havoc on Katsuyori‘s 
disorganized army. While Katsuyori and most of his 
high command escaped, it became obvious by 
nightfall that Nobunaga had carried the day. The 
Takeda withdrew back into their home province.
40
 
In light of such a brief description, it is easy 
to see the temptation of writing Nagashino off as 
being won solely by the use of firearms. As 
mentioned before, an examination of the details 
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reveals Nobunaga‘s genius in the use of combined 
arms tactics and his recognition of the power of 
infantry. If Nagashino had truly been a battle won 
by firepower mowing down cavalry, it would not 
have had several of the key features it did, such as 
its grueling length, over eight hours, or any 
prearranged fall back action by Nobunaga. Notably, 
much of the decisive damage from a strategic 
standpoint was done not by the gunners in the 
opening hours, but by the mounted samurai and the 
light-footed ashigaru during the twilight as they 
systematically destroyed the Takeda rearguard and 
large formations of panicked troops.
41
 
If it was not the use of firearms that decided 
the battle, then it was unquestionably Nobunaga‘s 
previously stated genius at combined arms and 
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dependence on infantry. Nobunaga was wise 
enough to take into consideration most, if not all, of 
the factors previously discussed in relation to 
weaponry and dominance of infantry. He made sure 
that his men were armed correctly and superiorly, 
and also made sure there were more of them than 
the enemy. Nobunaga‘s force on its own, 
disregarding his Tokugawa allies, numbered 30,000 
men, twice that of Katsuyori‘s army.42 
Tactically, he took full advantage of the 
infantry‘s capabilities and newfound flexibility. 
Homogenization of units by weapon types allowed 
him to deploy a strong front of purely arquebus 
troops, supported by units more suited for close 
combat, such as his well disciplined, effective, and 
numerous ashigaru spearmen. Indeed, it was in 
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these spearmen where a large portion of his 
advantage lay. Accepting the fact that the Takeda 
cavalry would probably reach his lines despite his 
innovative use of handguns, he set up his line of 
battle to give him an advantage wherever they broke 
through. By creating gaps in a staggered line of 
palisades, he effectively directed the focal point of 
the Takeda charge, right into the waiting spear ends 
of his ashigaru.  
The flexibility and ease of control 
specialization offered also allowed him to pull back, 
replace, and redeploy units quickly, a characteristic 
that proved invaluable when the samurai did 
manage to force a hole in the line. Enemy cavalry 
under Obata Masamori did at one point manage to 
breach the line of palisades during a lull in the 
firing, only to be bloodily repulsed as the gunners 
44 
fell back to make room for the spearmen and 
dismounted samurai to come up.
43
 Numerous other 
breakthroughs were also repelled by the ability of 
Nobunaga to set up a flank assault on the breaching 
forces, thanks to the deadly combination of 
ashigaru discipline, unit continuity, and the 
staggered line of palisades. At the end of the day, 
this flexibility also proved decisive as Nobunaga 
was able to react almost instantly to the retreating 
Takeda army, the disciplined and homogonous 
makeup of the units allowing him to keep them 
together and, in some instances, turn them on the 
spot to pursue the enemy. He also successfully 
employed his mounted samurai at this point, 
unleashing speed, martial prowess, and hunger for 
glory at just the right moment to make an impact. 
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Nagashino is an excellent example of how 
Nobunga‘s military power and political dominance 
was derived from the infantry. With this newfound 
emphasis on the ashigaru, the samurai suddenly 
found themselves in a clumsy situation, one that 
they would need to adapt to in order to survive. 
Their inferiors were beginning to take over their 
previous role, that of the protector and warrior of 
Japan, and their superiors, their daimyo lords, were 
beginning to strengthen their control over the 
battlefield. The samurai, while the elite, were no 
longer the sole arbiters on the field of battle. The 
technological edge, discipline, and sheer numbers of 
the ashigaru combined to reduce the mounted 
samurai from the dominant military force to a mere 
officer class over the course of the Sengoku Period, 
diluting their claims to prestige and allowing the 
46 
daimyo to control and benefit from war. The 
samurai were forced into their new role by both 
sides of the social scale, each side deriving its 
power directly from the newfound dominance of the 
infantry. From the bottom, smaller local samurai 
would be able to gain power and retainers, unit 
commanders, and even ashigaru would be able to 
ascend the social ladder, redefining the role of the 
samurai class as a whole. From the top, the need for 
centralized control to use the power of the infantry 
would give the daimyo unprecedented control over 
the samurai, allowing these local lords, rather than 
the warrior ideal of Japan, to take the proverbial 
reins of Japan‘s future. 
Samurai, especially during Sengoku, was by 
no means a definite term. While it is typically, and 
ideally, used to describe Japan‘s mounted archer 
47 
elite who were responsible for defending the island 
and winning personal glory on the battlefield, it 
could describe any man from those who met this 
ideal down to a simple village headmen, whose only 
similarity to their heroic brethren was that they 
served the same lord and could be called on for 
military service. These lower samurai, called 
village samurai or ji-samurai, would find 
themselves in positions of unexpected power and 
influence during the Sengoku Period.
44
 As de facto 
leaders in their community due to their status and 
comparative wealth, they became an important link 
from the daimyo to the village, where most of the 
recruits for infantry service were drawn from. In 
return for their services mustering and organizing 
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recruits the ji-samurai were in an ideal position not 
only to lead on the battlefield, but to demand 
privilege from their superiors in return for their 
services.
45
  
Thus, many of these lower samurai rose 
rapidly in military rank and wealth, expanding the 
ideas and sensibilities of the samurai class as a 
whole. Not only did they very visibly lack horses, 
an essential ingredient for the ideal samurai, but 
they could be employed as unit leaders, whose role 
was not to charge onto the field in search of glory, 
but to stay with their men to coordinate them with 
other units on the battlefield, interpret orders from 
the daimyo, and ensure that they were kept under 
control. Privilege and ascension in the samurai class 
did not have to take the form of battlefield glory, or 
                                                 
45
 Birt, ―Samurai in Passage,‖ 377-378. 
49 
even anything to do with war. Often times the 
rewards of the ji-samurai would be land, money, or 
simply more duties to attend to. There was also the 
distinct possibility of being promoted to a daimyo‘s 
household or personal staff and retainers, great 
honors not necessarily involving military duty. This 
mobility started to distort the image of what a 
samurai truly was, by having increasing numbers of 
rising samurai occupying administrative or practical 
jobs not necessarily on the battlefield or in pursuit 
of personal honor. All these factors began to 
change, from the bottom up, the way the samurai 
functioned on the battlefield and, as a social group, 
gave a new meaning to what it meant to be a 
samurai. 
In addition, promotion to the samurai rank 
was not unheard of. Skilled or brave unit leaders, 
50 
especially those of higher rank such as ashigaru 
kashira (captain of ashigaru), had the very real 
means to be promoted to samurai. This new status 
was often designated by taking a surname and the 
number of surnamed ashigaru kashira and ashigaru 
ko gashira on many, particularly late, Sengoku 
Period muster rolls and casualty lists indicates that 
this practice, while perhaps exceptional, was far 
from rare.
46
 These newer samurai would have much 
the same effect as the ji-samurai on the definition of 
the samurai class as a whole. With different 
responsibilities, skills, and levels of wealth, the 
newly promoted samurai would change the very 
definition of the word. Samurai were no longer the 
heroic ideal, charging out to meet the foe in 
personal combat, relying on the bow and spear. 
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They were now to be an officer class, a social rather 
than warrior elite who helped the daimyo campaign 
and command in battle, not win it on the strength of 
their own arms. Nobunaga displayed at least a 
temporary awareness of this fact at Nagashino, 
notably when he appointed members of his own 
bodyguard to command the arquebus gunners on the 
front line. These samurai were, most likely to their 
frustration, denied the opportunity to gain personal 
glory or charge into the enemy, but in turn ruled the 
ashigaru with an iron fist, keeping them disciplined, 
steady and most importantly, close together, making 
it easier to withstand the Takeda cavalry charge. 
If the role of the samurai was being 
squeezed and adapted from below by those rising 
through the ranks, then it was also being redefined 
from above, in some instances with no pretext of 
52 
subtlety. This change came from the daimyo, the 
lords whom the samurai served and were ostensibly 
loyal to, and who were now making the most of the 
Sengoku Period turmoil to improve their position. 
Technically, they were samurai in and of 
themselves as the shogunate was a military regime 
and thus its officials were all of military rank, and 
their official title of shugo-daimyo reflected this. 
Historically, they exercised very little actual control 
over battlefield events and acted more as a military 
governor of their province, seeing that civil affairs 
were carried out while the samurai warriors sought 
renown on the battlefield.
47
 This idea began to 
change with the onset of Sengoku Jidai, as daimyo 
began to have a more invested interest in battlefield 
happenings as the course of one battle could see 
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them forced out of office, overthrown by retainers, 
or suddenly propelled into prominence. Daimyo 
thus began to exercise more control over individual 
battles and the samurai below them though several 
different means, almost all of which have their roots 
in the predominance of the ashigaru. 
Battles between samurai armies have often 
been compared to battles in medieval Europe, where 
the paradigm of a knight and his retainers on the 
battlefield reigned supreme. Perhaps a more fitting 
comparison is between the samurai and the 
Homeric heroes of the Trojan War. Combat for 
samurai was much more of a ritualized, individual 
affair than a knightly charge, and the retainers and 
rabble of infantry would, at the onset of a battle, 
demurely keep back and let the two individual 
54 
heroes fight it out for supremacy.
48
 This kind of 
ritualized single combat is devoid of central control, 
or indeed any real scheme for winning the battle, 
making it difficult for a daimyo, with his renewed 
interest in the fighting, to exert influence. The shift 
of battlefield dominance to the infantry changed 
this. As noted before, infantry armies were large 
and worked best when segregated based on 
weaponry, in effect creating different ―branches‖ of 
the army and different units within those branches, 
all of which needed some sort of central 
coordination to work effectively. Samurai, with 
their individualized combat routines and emphasis 
on personal heroism, were in no position to take that 
role. The daimyo, already nominally the head of 
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state and the one man of power presumably more 
interested in winning effectively than being first 
into battle, was in an ideal position to assume the 
mantle of command. The infantry, in effect, created 
a need for centralized command and control, one 
that allowed the daimyo, or anyone who felt like 
seizing the title, to benefit greatly. 
Once this basic relationship was established, 
the daimyo could take steps to not only increase 
their power, but also to rein in the samurai both 
politically and militarily. With the coming of larger 
and larger armies, one method of control adopted by 
the daimyo was that of battlefield formations. While 
they continued to evolve throughout the Sengoku 
Period, the formations were almost universally 
based on old Chinese concepts, with modification 
for some distinctly Japanese features, such as the 
56 
large body of arquebus troops.
49
 Two things are 
exceptional about the battle formations: the 
integration of infantry and the way in which they 
facilitated centralized coordination. The first is 
notable because battle formations were rarely 
cavalry-centric and made good use of the 
specialization, a feature almost exclusive to 
infantry, to work and win the day. For example, the 
koyaku (yoke) formation puts up a strong frontage 
of gunners and archers supported by spearmen, with 
a large force of dismounted samurai in an arrow 
shaped reserve.
50
 The placement and overlap of 
these units allowed them to provide mutual support, 
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something only possible with the advent of the 
specialized infantry unit.  
The way in which they facilitated 
centralized coordination is most important when the 
daimyo‘s ability to control the battlefield is taken 
into account. Not only did having every man in a set 
place make setting up and executing predefined 
maneuvers infinitely easier, but the amount of drill 
and discipline that goes into being able to make 
such formations work helps to turn the previously 
footloose ashigaru into a loyal fighting force.
51
 It 
also allowed for a good deal of battlefield control 
over the samurai, who have been organized into 
specialized units and made to follow orders, even if 
it goes against their ideals. In the case of the koyaku 
especially, the samurai are held in reserve and not 
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in front of the formation, the place where any self-
respecting and competitive samurai hero should be! 
This centralized power the infantry gave to 
the daimyo also began to manifest itself in the 
socio-political areas of Japanese life. Daimyo began 
to exercise stricter control in the form of ―house 
codes‖ and ―house precepts‖ aimed at governing 
their domains, populace, and especially samurai. 
Many of the articles in the codes are aimed 
particularly at demolishing samurai battlefield 
independence and putting them in a subordinate and 
contained role. For example, Article 26 of the Yūki 
House Code: 
Article 26: Wherever it may be to, you must 
not gallop forth as a lone rider without 
receiving orders from the Yūki. But when 
59 
summoned by the Yūki, you must not be 
tardy.
52
  
 
Or, even more strongly worded, Articles 67 and 72: 
Article 67: To gallop forth 
heedlessly and without thought 
because you hear the sound of the 
conch shell from the main fort that 
signals taking to the field is quite 
unpardonable. If the shell sounds, 
you should go to a village and 
quickly dispatch some underling or 
servant to the main fort and have him 
inquire into where you should go. 
Only then should you gallop forth… 
Article 72: Men of the horse units 
should obviously not join an outside 
group, nor should they join a 
different group within the Yūki 
house…The horse units should 
always act in conjunction with ten or 
twenty other riders and not mingle 
with other groups.
53
 
The daimyo here mean to rein in as best they 
can the battle-eager samurai. Notice especially the 
discouragement of riding out alone and the 
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emphasis on staying within a unit. Both these 
concepts helped the daimyo to exercise more 
control over their subjects, who had previously been 
dominant in the arts and strategy of war and may 
not take kindly to being simply ordered into 
formation. Using the ideas of honor that underlay 
almost all codes created by feudal lords and the 
samurai‘s strong virtue and ideal of loyalty, the 
daimyo began to fundamentally change the 
definition of the samurai class from above, even as 
they sought greater control and power for 
themselves. Just as they elevated ji-samurai and 
unit commanders to dilute the image of the warrior 
class, so to they also compressed them into elite 
fighting units or put them in commands subordinate 
to themselves on the battlefield. Being a samurai 
during Sengoku Japan slowly began to mean being 
61 
a member of the officer caste, one who was above 
the foot soldiers and other members of the same 
class, but who was ultimately subordinate to the 
daimyo and certainly not in charge of his own 
individual actions or glory on the battlefield. 
It is worth reiterating that this power exerted 
by the daimyo over the samurai was made possible 
by the need for centralized control created by the 
numbers, specialization, and increasing 
professionalism of the infantry. The most prominent 
and powerful daimyo did not construct their power 
around a large base of mounted samurai supporters; 
they instead made sure that their infantry were well 
supplied, numerous, and under their direct control. 
Oda Nobunaga, a man of previously recognized 
military capacity, invested his money at the outset 
of the military campaign season of 1549 not in 
62 
samurai katana and horses, but in 500 matchlock 
guns with which to equip his infantry.
54
 House 
codes, in addition to keeping a tight hold on the 
samurai, supported the arming of multiple 
infantrymen over a single samurai, such as in the 
famous article from Asakura Toshikage: 
4. Do not excessively covet swords 
made by famous masters. Even if 
you own a sword or dagger worth 
10,000 pieces, it can be overcome by 
100 spears each worth 100 pieces. 
Therefore, use the 10,000 pieces to 
procure 100 spears, and arm 100 
men with them. You can in this 
manner defend yourself in time of 
war.
55
 
 
While this code was written early in the 
Sengoku Period, it demonstrates that at least some 
                                                 
54
 Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on Japanese 
Warfare, 1543-98,‖ 238. 
55
 ―The Seventeen-Article Injunction of Asakura 
Toshikage, c. 1480,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to 
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 176. 
63 
daimyo grasped the importance of the ashigaru over 
mounted samurai in maintaining their power. Once 
the correlation between the infantryman and the 
newfound military influence of the daimyo was 
fully comprehended, they understandably took 
measures to secure and solidify it. One previously 
discussed method was through armor, the okashi 
gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which they could use to 
standardize the quality and appearance of their 
army. Another notable way of doing so, that also 
conveniently undermined traditional samurai 
power, was of direct recruitment of ashigaru from 
the villages. Traditionally, samurai had been 
required to bring men from the area which they 
ruled, who were then loosely organized and 
employed. By going straight to the source, so to 
speak, the daimyo cut the samurai middleman out 
64 
of the picture and increased his own influence over 
the infantry units.
56
 This practice also had the side-
effect of increasing the importance of the ji-samurai 
as mentioned earlier who, as a result of interest in 
recruitment from their villages, had more contact 
and political clout with their daimyo lords. 
The man who perhaps best understood this 
correlation and took the most dramatic steps to 
protect it was Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second great 
unifier of Japan himself. Having come to power 
after the death of Nobunaga, he proceeded during 
the later decades of the 16
th
 century to unify all of 
Japan under his control through a series of military 
and social maneuvers that rivaled Nobunaga‘s in 
mastery. Even before he had conquered the entire 
island, he refined and created an efficient standing 
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army, which depended almost solely on him for its 
supplies, arms, and equipment. He managed this 
task by setting up centralized government storage 
systems and military contracts, which made 
virtually all those under his command rely on his 
will in order to conduct military operations.
57
 
His masterstrokes in securing power came, 
however, in 1588 and 1591, when he issued two 
separate, but mutually supportive, edicts that 
changed the structure of Japan for well over two 
and half centuries. 1588 saw the implementation of 
the infamous ―Sword Hunt‖ Edict, which made it 
forbidden for farmers ―to have in their possession 
any swords, short swords, bows, spears, firearms, or 
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other types of weapons.‖58 The weapons collected 
from this mass confiscation ostensibly went to the 
creation of a gigantic statue of Buddha, but most 
probably went into state armories to prepare for the 
invasion of Korea launched in 1592.
59
 In one stroke, 
Hideyoshi had essentially created a military class in 
Japan. By disarming the farmers and commoners, 
the only weapons left in the state were those 
wielded by the soldiers in the standing armies, 
which included previously recruited ashigaru. In 
1591, the class realities that had developed because 
of the Sword Hunt were solidified in law when 
Hideyoshi issued the Separation Edict, which 
decreed that any man attempting to leave his social 
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class would be ―punished accordingly‖ and his 
village or master could be ―regarded as committing 
a culpable offense.‖60 By creating punishments for 
leaving one‘s station in life, warrior, farmer, 
commoner, or merchant, Hideyoshi in effect created 
a government enforced class system, one that would 
have huge ramifications for the ashigaru and the 
samurai. 
Since ashigaru were now locked into the 
military, they officially formed a lower class of 
samurai. Hideyoshi‘s edict had simply legalized 
and solidified the system that had already been 
developed: the assimilation of the ashigaru and, to a 
degree, daimyo into the samurai class and the 
accompanying redefinition. The term ―samurai‖ 
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now referred essentially to any fighting man rather 
than the heroic ideal. What had developed 
throughout the Sengoku Period was essentially a 
larger warrior class with very real social mobility; 
ashigaru could become unit leaders, unit leaders 
could become samurai, and samurai could become 
anything from the lord of a local province to a 
daimyo. Having risen from the ranks himself, 
though never having quite attained the samurai 
class, Hideyoshi must have been fully aware of the 
system that was developing and simply took the 
dramatic step to implement it on a legal and 
national level in order to protect his own power. He 
would have little to worry about from upstart 
samurai now that they had officially become an 
officer class and only had the power to move up or 
down in the system, rather than out through 
69 
demonstrations of personal prowess on the 
battlefield. Hideyoshi‘s rise and the power system 
he left in place for the Tokugawa shoguns was 
engendered and supported by the rising star of the 
ashigaru footman. It simply took a leader, or 
multiple leaders, who knew how to use them and 
who recognized their power to truly change the face 
of Japan. 
St. Francis Xavier‘s simplistic observation 
of them in 1550 was perhaps truer than any concept 
the Japanese had of their own warriors at the time: 
―They are excellent archers and fight on foot, 
although there are horses in the country.‖61 As a 
foreigner observing the warfare of Sengoku Jidai, 
he picked up on two things quickly: the martial skill 
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of the Japanese and the prevalence of the ashigaru. 
The use of horses is casually dismissed, something 
it would take a great man of Japan another twenty 
five years to even consider doing. Yet such a simple 
observation cuts to the heart of it. It was the 
infantryman, the lowly light-foot, who had the 
power to change Japan. Geography and technology 
conspired to put it into his hands and allowed able 
leaders such as Oda Nobunaga to win decisive 
victories with ingenious tactics. That same power 
was lent to Toyotomi Hideyoshi who would bring to 
a head all the change that had been over a century in 
the making and would redefined not only what it 
meant to be a samurai, but what it meant to be a 
warrior in medieval Japan. As Asakura Sōteki wrote 
in his house precepts ―call the warrior a dog, call 
him a beast: winning is his business,‖ an attitude 
71 
that would shape Japan and give the ashigaru the 
necessary influence to do so.
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